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Abstract 
The development of theory of mind use was investigated by giving a computerised task to 177 
female participants divided into five age groups: Child I (7.3-9.7 years); Child II (9.8-11.4); 
Adolescent I (11.5-13.9); Adolescent II (14.0-17.7); Adults (19.1-27.5). Participants viewed a set 
of shelves containing objects, which they were instructed to move by a “Director” who could see 
some but not all of the objects. Correct interpretation of critical instructions required participants 
to use the director’s perspective and only move objects that the director could see. In a control 
condition, participants were asked to ignore objects in slots with a grey background. Accuracy 
improved similarly in both conditions between Child I and Adolescent II. However, while 
performance of the Adolescent II and Adult groups did not differ in the control condition, the 
Adolescent II group made more errors than the adults in the experimental condition. These 
results suggest that theory of mind use improves between late adolescence and adulthood. 
Thus, while theory of mind tasks are passed by age four, these data indicate that the interaction 
between theory of mind and executive functions continues to develop in late adolescence. 
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Introduction 
Theory of mind - the ability to attribute mental states such as beliefs, desires and intentions - has 
been the subject of much research in developmental psychology and, more recently, in 
neuroscience. A large body of research indicates that theory of mind develops in the first few 
years in typically developing children: basic perspective taking emerges in the first 18 months 
(Sodian, Thoermer, & Metz, 2007), understanding false belief by four years (Wellman, Cross, & 
Watson, 2001; or younger: Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007) and 
second order metarepresentation by six or seven (Perner & Wimmer, 1985). This early 
development of theory of mind sits uncomfortably with the finding from a large number of 
neuroimaging studies that brain regions critically involved in mental state attribution, in particular 
medial prefrontal cortex and lateral temporo-parietal regions, continue to develop both 
structurally (Giedd, Blumenthal, Jeffries, Castellanos, Liu, Zijdenbos, et al., 1999; Shaw, Kabani, 
Lerch, Eckstrand, Lenroot, Gogtay, et al., 2008; Sowell, Thompson, Holmes, Jernigan, & Toga, 
1999; Sowell, Thompson, Leonard, Welcome, Kan, & Toga, 2004) and functionally (Blakemore, 
den Ouden, Choudhury, & Frith, 2007; Wang, Lee, Sigman, & Dapretto, 2006; Moriguchi, 
Ohnishi, Mori, Matsuda, & Komaki, 2007; see Blakemore, 2008, for review) in the second and 
third decades of life. The protracted development in adolescence and early adulthood of the 
brain regions involved in theory of mind might be expected to affect mental state understanding.  
 
There are several possible explanations for the lack of evidence of theory of mind development 
beyond early childhood. First, the tasks that have been used to test theory of mind in early 
development are not appropriate for testing older children and adolescents. Since most theory of 
mind tasks are passed by five years, ceiling effects might be obscuring the observation of any 
further development. Second, tasks typically directly enquire about children’s representations of 
another person’s mental states; they do not tap into how theory of mind is used to drive 
decisions and actions in everyday life. We hypothesised that, while theory of mind per se might 
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not develop beyond early childhood (though see e.g., Chandler, Boyes & Ball, 1990; Kuhn, in 
press; Robinson & Apperly, 1998), the interaction between theory of mind and other cognitive 
processes such as executive functions continues to mature into adolescence. In order to test 
this hypothesis, and avoid ceiling effects in performance, we adapted a task developed by 
Keysar, Barr, Balin, and Brauner (2000) and Keysar, Lin, and Barr (2003) that showed that even 
adults have difficulty using theory of mind to guide behaviour.  
 
Keysar et al. (2000, 2003) report that adults frequently fail to use their conceptual competence 
for theory of mind in an online communication game in which they need to take account of a 
speaker’s perspective. Keysar and colleagues designed a referential communication task in 
which participants viewed a 4x4 grid. The grid contained various objects in different slots, and 
participants were instructed by a “director” (a confederate) to move certain objects around the 
grid (see Figure 1a for a schematic of the experimental setup based on our own stimuli). Certain 
slots in the grid were occluded, thus the director could see some but not all of the objects visible 
to the participant. Critical instructions required the participant to use the information about the 
director’s perspective to interpret instructions. Although clearly capable of understanding that the 
director has a different perspective, adult participants frequently failed to use this information 
when interpreting the director’s instructions. This can be considered as evidence that humans 
are prone to egocentric bias. Evidence from a group of 4- to 12-year-olds suggests that children 
are more prone to such egocentric errors than adults (Epley, Morewedge, & Keysar, 2004b).  
 
To investigate the development of theory of mind use between late childhood and adulthood, we 
adapted Keysar et al.’s Director task so that it was suitable for children and presented on a 
computer. We tested the ability of 179 female participants aged between 7 and 27 years. In a 
control No-Director condition, participants were instructed to ignore objects in grey slots. Thus, 
both Director and No-Director conditions involved online inhibition of a proponent response of 
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moving the object that best fits the instruction from the participant’s perspective, as well as 
general task demands such as rule following, working memory and so on. Thus, the two 
conditions were designed to be matched in terms of executive functions. The critical difference 
between conditions was that, in the Director condition, participants were instructed to take into 
account which objects the Director could and could not see whereas, in the No-director 
condition, participants were instructed to take into account the colour of the slot the object was 
in. Therefore, the only difference between conditions was that the Director condition involved the 
interaction between theory of mind (taking into account the director’s perspective) and executive 
functions (inhibiting the egocentric bias and performing the appropriate motor action). Accuracy 
and response times were measured in all conditions. Based on the findings that the neural 
circuitry for theory of mind is developing during adolescence, we predicted that accuracy would 
improve with age in the Director condition over and above improvements in memory and 
inhibition abilities inherent to the No-Director condition. 
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Method & Materials 
Participants 
179 female volunteers between the ages of 7.3 and 27.5 were recruited for this study. Children 
and adolescents were recruited from two London schools for girls, while adults were recruited 
from UCL Psychology Department volunteer database. All participants spoke English as their 
first language. The child and adolescent participants were divided according to age into four 
groups of similar N to the adult group. Verbal ability was measured in children using the British 
Picture Vocabulary Scale II scores (BPVS II; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Burley, 1997), which is 
quick to administer, and in adults using the vocabulary subtest of the WASI (Wechsler, 1999). 
Data from two adolescents were excluded from the analysis: one had a verbal IQ score of less 
than 75; the other did not respond to any trials of one experimental condition. Table 1 presents 
details of all participants whose data were included in the analyses. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
There was no significant difference between the verbal IQs of the groups (one way ANOVA: 
F(4,172)=0.61, p>.6). Informed consent was obtained from the primary caregiver of each child 
and adolescent participant, and from the adults, and the study was approved by the local ethics 
committee.  
 
Design 
This experiment used a mixed-design with two within-subjects factors (Condition: Director, No-
Director; and Trial type: Control or Experimental) and one between-subjects factor (Age group: 
Children I, Children II, Adolescent I, Adolescent II, Adults). 
 
A computer simulation based on the task designed by Keysar et al. (2000) was used (task 
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developed by Apperly, I.A., Carroll, D.J., Samson, D., Humphreys, G.W., Qureshi, A. & Moffatt, 
G., personal communication). The program was written using E-Prime version 2.0 (Psychology 
Software Tools, Inc.) and presented on a laptop. The stimuli showed a 4x4 set of shelves 
containing eight different objects (see Figure 1 for example of stimuli). Five slots were occluded 
from the view of the “Director”, who stood on the other side of the shelves and therefore viewed 
the shelves from behind (see Figure 1). The participant was instructed to listen to instructions 
given by the Director (heard through computer speakers). In each trial, the Director instructed 
the participant to move one of the eight objects in a particular direction. Using a computer 
mouse, participants were required to click on the object they thought the Director was referring 
to and to drag it into the appropriate slot on the shelves.  
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
Experimental instructions required participants to take account of the director’s perspective (see 
Figure 1c). The correct response was to select the “target” object, which could be seen by the 
director, and was the best fit for his instruction if his visual access was taken into account. For 
example in Figure 1c when the director asks to move the small ball left, the correct response 
would be to move the tennis ball, which is the smaller of the two balls visible to the director. If 
participants ignored his perspective they would select the “distractor” object, which was invisible 
to the director. In Figure 1c, the incorrect response would be to move the golf ball, which is the 
smallest ball in the display, but which is invisible to the director. In the trials with the Control 
instruction, the arrangement of the objects in the shelves was identical to that in the 
Experimental instruction trials, except that an irrelevant object replaced the distractor object (e.g. 
the plane on Figure 1d). Filler trial instructions referred only to objects in clear slots, i.e. visible to 
both director and participant. For example on Figure 1c the director could ask to move the tractor 
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right. The order of the Filler, Control and Experimental trials was counterbalanced between 
subjects. 
 
In the “No-Director” condition, participants were told that the Director was gone and they would 
hear instructions to move objects again and that these instructions would refer only to items in 
the clear slots; thus, objects in slots with a grey background should be ignored. The No-Director 
trials were identical in every way to the Director trials except that, instead of having to take into 
account the Director’s perspective, participants had to follow the rule of ignoring all objects in 
slots with a grey background. Experimental, Control and Filler trials were included in the No-
Director condition, and trial order was counter-balanced between subjects. 
 
Two sets of eight different shelf-object configurations were created, each presented once with 
an occluded distractor object (Experimental trial) and once with an irrelevant object (Control 
trial). One set was presented in the Director condition, the other in the No-Director condition, 
thus the stimuli were not repeated for individual subjects. The sets were counterbalanced across 
subjects. Each stimulus was presented for two seconds before the first auditory instruction was 
given. Three auditory instructions were given per stimulus and each lasted 2.2 seconds, and 
participants were given an additional 3.6 seconds to make their response. Each display was 
presented with 2 Filler instructions and 1 Control or Relational instruction. In total there were 
thus 8 Control trials, 8 Experimental trials, and 48 Filler trials in each condition (Director and No-
Director). The order of stimulus presentation was counter-balanced between participants. Each 
condition lasted approximately 5.5 minutes. 
 
Procedure 
Standardised instructions were read to the participant and they were shown an example 
stimulus. For the Director condition it was explained that, on each trial, the Director would 
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instruct the participant which object to move and where to move it. Emphasis was placed on the 
fact that the director has a different perspective to the participant by showing participants an 
example of the director’s view of the shelves (see Figure 1a and 1b). Each participant was asked 
to give an example of an object that only she, and not the Director, could see (i.e. in an occluded 
slot), and an object that both she and the Director could see (i.e. in a clear slot), to demonstrate 
that she understood that the director had a different perspective from hers. All participants 
performed this correctly, indicating that they had understood the instructions and that they 
knew the director could not see all the objects, and they were not given further feedback 
regarding the requirement to take the director’s perspective into account. Before the start of the 
No-Director condition, new instructions were read and participants were shown an example of a 
No-Director stimulus and asked to give an example of an object that was in a slot with a grey 
background. Participants were then asked to move an object as they would in the experiment to 
demonstrate they understood what was required of them. All participants were tested individually 
in a quiet room. All participants carried out the Director condition before the No-Director 
condition in order to prevent participants from applying the strategy provided in the No-Director 
condition to the Director condition.  
 
Data Analysis 
Mean accuracy and median response times in correctly responded trials were calculated for 
each participant in each Condition (Director/No-Director) and Trial type (Control/Experimental). 
Mixed model repeated measures ANOVA with two within-subject factors and one between-
subject factor (Age group – five levels) were performed on group mean accuracy and group 
mean response times. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc independent or paired t-tests were 
performed to investigate further significant main effects and interactions. Possible floor and 
ceiling effects in accuracy were investigated by comparing performance in Experimental and 
ToM development during adolescence 
 10 
Control trials in each condition and each age group using paired t-tests. Statistical analysis 
results are provided with standard p-values and effect sizes: Cohen’s d for t-tests (Cohen, 1969), 
d=0.2, 0.5 and 0.8 correspond respectively to small, medium and large effect sizes (Cohen, 
1992); and partial eta squared (ηp2) for F-tests, which is the proportion of the effect plus error 
variance that is attributable to the effect (Cohen, 1973).  
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Results 
Accuracy data 
Participants made fewer than 3% errors in Filler trials on average, and the data for these trials 
were not analysed. The mean accuracy in the critical (Director, Experimental) condition reflected 
a range of accuracies across subjects, as predicted on the basis of previous work on adults, 
rather than a bimodal distribution with participants either doing the task well or failing it 
completely.  
 
A 2x2x5 mixed model repeated measures ANOVA with Condition (Director/No-Director), Trial 
type (Control/Experimental) and Age group (Child I, Child II, Adolescent I, Adolescent II and 
Adults) was performed on accuracy (see Figure 2). All main effects were significant: participants 
made more errors in Experimental than Control trials (F(1,172)=684.04, p<.001, ηp2=.799); more 
errors in the Director than the No Director condition (F(1,172)=553.25, p<.001, ηp2 =.763); and 
accuracy changed with age (F(4,172)=8.94, p<.001, ηp2=.172). There was a significant 
interaction between Trial type and Age group (F(4,172)=7.45, p<.001, ηp2=.148), between 
Condition and Age group (F(4,172)=750.10, p=.015, ηp2=.068) and between Condition and Trial 
type (F(1,172)=548.76, p<.001, ηp2=.761). The three-way interaction was also significant 
(F(4,172)=2.52, p=.043, ηp2=.055) and was explored further by looking at Experimental and 
Control trials separately.  
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
A 2x5 repeated measures ANOVA performed on the Experimental trials only showed a 
significant effect of Condition (F(1,172)=585.54, p<.001, ηp2=.773), with more errors in the 
Director condition than in the No-Director condition. There was also a main effect of Age group 
(F(4,172)=8.49, p<.001, ηp2=.165), and a significant interaction between Age group and 
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Condition (F(4,172)=2.99, p=.02, ηp2=.065). A similar 2x5 repeated measures ANOVA performed 
on the Control trials revealed no significant main effect (Condition: F(1,172)=1.59, p>.2; Age 
group: F(4,172)=1.45, p>.2) or interaction (F(4,172)=.59, p>.6).  
 
Performance in Experimental trials was explored further. A 2x4 repeated measures ANOVA 
performed on the two child and two adolescent groups and Condition (Director/No-Director) 
revealed no Condition by Age group interaction (F(3,137)=.12, p>.9) suggesting that the 2x5 
interaction effect was driven by the adults. However, the main effects of Condition 
(F(1,137)=563.84, p<.001, ηp2=.805), and Age group (F(3,137)=4.79, p=.003, ηp2=.095) were 
significant. Post-hoc t-tests on accuracy averaged between the two conditions indicated that 
only the Child I (7.3-9.7 years old) and Adolescent II groups (14.0-17.7) differed significantly 
(t(68)=3.87, p<.001, d=.93), with Child I participants making more errors. A 2x2 repeated 
measures ANOVA performed on the Adolescent II group (aged 14.0-17.7) and the adults 
showed a significant main effect of Condition (F(1,69)=152.65, p<.001, ηp2=.689) as well as a 
Condition by Age group interaction (F(1,69)=4.91, p=.03, ηp2=.066). There was no significant 
main effect of Age group (F(1,69)=2.78, p=.1). Follow-up t-tests showed that the adolescent 
participants made marginally significantly more errors than adults in the Director (t(69)=1.98, 
p=.052, d=.47), but not in the No-director condition (t(69)=.34, p>0.3).  
 
Two additional analyses were performed. First, we addressed the issue of whether participants 
were performing at floor in the Director Experimental trials. If the children were never taking the 
Director’s perspective into consideration, one could expect them to make a similar number of 
“errors” in the Experimental trials, i.e. not selecting the Distractor item, the number of errors 
made in the Control trials. The Control trials were thus used as a baseline, and the percentage 
of correct responses in the Experimental trials was compared to the percentage of errors in the 
Control trials of the Director condition. All age groups showed significant differences between 
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the two types of trials (all p<.001, d>1.1), suggesting no group performed at floor in the Director 
Experimental trials. 
 
Second, we addressed the issue of whether participants were performing at ceiling in the No-
Director Experimental trials. Accuracy in Experimental trials was compared to accuracy in No-
Director Control trials. All age groups showed significant differences between these two types of 
trial (all p<.05, d>.45), suggesting no group performed at ceiling in No-Director Experimental 
trials. 
 
Response time data 
The median response times (RTs) were calculated from correct responses for each subject. 
Subjects with no correct response in one of the conditions were omitted from the analysis 
(resulting group sizes: Child I n=29, Child II n=31, Adolescent I n=25, Adolescent II n=26, Adults 
n=31). Mean RTs were calculated for each group (see Figure 3). Note that the same analyses 
performed on both correct and incorrect trials together showed similar results. 
 
Insert Figure 3 here 
 
A 2x2x5 ANOVA performed on the RTs showed that all main effects were significant: RTs were 
slower in the No-Director than in the Director condition (F(1,137)=37.92, p<.001, ηp2=.217), 
slower in Control than in Experimental trials (F(1,137)=8.82, p=.004, ηp2=.061), and changed 
with age (F(4,137)=4.56, p=.002, ηp2=.118). Post-hoc t-tests indicated that Child I participants 
(7.3-9.7 years old) were slower than Adolescent II participants (14.0-17.7 years old; t(53)=3.66, 
p=.006, d=.986) and than the adults (t(58)=3.65, p=.006, d=.943); no other between group 
difference reached significance. There were interactions between Condition and Trial type 
(F(1,137)=4.46, p=.037, ηp2 =.032), with a greater RT difference between Experimental and 
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Control trials in the Director than in the No-Director condition, and between Condition and Age 
group (F(4,137)=6.22, p<.001, ηp2 =.154). This latter interaction effect was investigated further. 
RTs did not change with age in the Director condition (F(4,137)=.99, p>0.4), whereas there was 
a significant effect of Age group in the No-Director condition (F(4,137)=8.82, p<0.001, ηp2 
=.205). Post-hoc t-tests showed that, in the No-Director condition, the Child I group responded 
more slowly than the Adolescent II group (t(53)=4.13, p=.001, d=1.12) and than adults 
(t(58)=5.42, p<.001, d=1.40), and the Child II group responded more slowly than the adults 
(t(60)=3.60, p=.007, d=.913). The two remaining interactions were not significant: Trial type by 
Age group (F(4,137)=1.05, p=.4), and the three way interaction between Condition, Trial type 
and Age group (F(4,137)=1.59, p=.2). 
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Discussion 
In this study, we tested the ability of a large sample of children, adolescents and young adults 
(aged 7-27) to use information about another person’s perspective when following their 
instructions. Critical trials required participants to use information about the Director’s 
perspective, i.e. which objects he could see and which he could not, to interpret his instructions 
and respond appropriately by inhibiting their egocentric bias. In the control No-Director condition, 
participants were instructed to ignore objects in particular locations. Thus, in the critical Director 
trials, participants had to take into account the fact that the Director is unable to see (and 
therefore cannot be referring to) certain objects, whereas in the No-Director condition, 
participants were given an explicit rule to facilitate performance. Both Director and No-Director 
conditions required a variety of executive functions. In addition, the Director condition also 
required level-1 perspective taking, the ability to represent what another person can see (Flavell, 
Everett, Croft & Flavell, 1981). This ability is a core component of theory of mind since, to predict 
and explain other person’s behaviour, we make inferences about their knowledge or beliefs on 
the basis of their visual access. In the Director condition, participants used information derived 
from level-1 perspective taking to infer what the Director knew, and therefore what object he 
could be referring to, and then had to perform the appropriate motor action towards that object. 
 
In the current computerised task, all participants were able to describe which objects the director 
could and could not see when directly prompted during the practice. This demonstrated that all 
participants were able to achieve level-1 perspective taking, as would be expected. However, 
during the testing phase, a large proportion of participants in all groups frequently failed to use 
information about the Director’s perspective to interpret his instruction and move the appropriate 
object. These findings are consistent with a real life version of the task (Keysar et al., 2000; 
2003), in which participants had to pass objects in a set of shelves to a real director whose view 
of some of the objects was physically obscured. The data fit with other suggestions that adult 
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perspective-taking is subject to egocentric or “reality” bias (e.g., Birch & Bloom, 2004; 2007; 
Epley, Keysar, Van Boven & Gilovich, 2004a; Mitchell, Robinson, Isaacs & Nye, 1996). 
 
The developmental results indicate that accuracy improved in a similar way in both Director and 
No-Director trials in early adolescence. However, in the No-Director condition, there was no 
further improvement in accuracy beyond adolescence (14-17.7 years) whereas, in the Director 
condition, accuracy continued to improve between adolescence and adulthood. A possible floor 
effect in the Director condition in the younger children and a ceiling effect in the No-Director 
condition in older participants were tested for and did not appear to drive the critical interaction 
observed between the older adolescents and the adults. Following instructions in both the 
Director and No-Director conditions involves holding the task rule in mind over the whole block, 
and potentially inhibiting a prepotent response (towards the distractor object) on a trial-by-trial 
basis. The initial parallel improvement in accuracy with age observed in both conditions is in line 
with previous studies demonstrating development beyond childhood of certain executive 
functions, such as inhibition of a prepotent response (Casey, Trainor, Orendi, Schubert, 
Nystrom, Giedd, et al., 1997; Tamm, Menon, & Reiss, 2002) and working memory (e.g. 
Anderson, Anderson, Northam, Jacobs, & Catroppa, 2001; see Romine & Reynolds, 2005, for a 
review). However, the continued improvement of accuracy only in the Director condition 
suggests that the ability to take account of another person’s perspective to direct appropriate 
behaviour is still improving in late adolescence, after working memory and response inhibition 
abilities recruited in this task have reached adult levels.  
 
An improvement with age in the time taken for correct responses was observed in the No-
Director condition and, together with the improvements in accuracy, is likely to reflect the 
maturation of the ability to inhibit a prepotent response (towards the object in the grey 
background) while holding information in mind (see Romine & Reynolds, 2005, for a review). 
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There was no evidence of age-related changes in response time in the Director condition. 
Moreover, the time taken for correct use of the Director’s perspective was relatively fast 
compared with the No-Director condition. This difference in response times may indicate that 
participants were faster to inhibit a response towards an object that was not seen by another 
person than towards an object arbitrarily selected by a memorised rule. Response times were 
calculated from correct trials only (though in fact similar patterns are observed if both correct and 
incorrect responses are combined). The difference in RT between the Director and No-Director 
conditions suggests that participants who were able to take into account the perspective of the 
director did this faster than when they were required to ignore objects in a grey background. This 
could indicate that, when answering correctly to Experimental trials of the Director condition, 
participants did not simply apply a rule similar to that of the No-Director condition, and that this 
strategy, possibly related to real-life properties of objects and occlusions, was more efficient, 
once in place, than the arbitrary rule given by the experimenter. This raises the interesting 
possibility that the reduction in error rate in the Director condition between older adolescents and 
adults was not due to increases in the efficiency of perspective-taking processes. Rather, it may 
be that these perspective-taking processes are relatively efficient throughout the developmental 
period studied here but that an important additional change is the propensity for participants to 
take account of a speaker’s perspective. We speculate that changes in such higher-level 
strategies for the use of “theory of mind” may be an important locus of development over and 
above improvements in the efficiency of basic theory of mind processes. 
 
Our data extend previous developmental studies using similar paradigms. Epley and colleagues 
found that children aged 4 to 12 years are more prone to egocentric errors (ignoring the 
Director’s perspective in Experimental trials) than are adults (Epley et al., 2004b). In contrast, 
Nadig and Sedivy (2002) found that 6-year-olds’ eye movements showed sensitivity to the 
Director’s perspective. Reasons for the discrepancy between these results include the fact that 
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Nadig and Sedivy’s task was much simpler, using a 2*2 rather than a 4*4 array, and also that 
the Director’s instructions were ambiguous if the speaker’s perspective was ignored, which may 
have prompted children to take account of the speaker’s perspective (see Keysar et al. 2003 for 
discussion). It would be interesting to record gaze behaviour in a more complex array, as was 
used in the current study and by Epley et al. (2004b), to investigate possible implicit processing 
(reflected in participants’ eye movements) of the Director’s perspective during adolescence. 
 
This is the first time that an empirical study has shown evidence of such late development on a 
task that involves representing another person’s mental states. There is a long history of 
research on the early development of theory of mind, which has consistently shown that false 
belief tasks are normally passed by age four or five (Wellman et al., 2001) or even earlier (Onishi 
& Baillargeon, 2005; Surian et al., 2007). Very few studies have investigated theory of mind 
performance development beyond early childhood (e.g. Perner & Wimmer, 1985). Here we 
suggest that the improvement until mid-adolescence in the capacity to meet the demands that 
both Director and No-Director conditions make on working memory and inhibitory control is 
followed during late adolescence by an additional age-related increase in participants’ 
propensity to take account of a speaker’s perspective to guide behaviour. We suggest that this 
developmental pattern reflects continuing maturation of the interaction between theory of mind 
and executive functions. While the current study cannot determine the cause of this late 
development, our data fit with recent neuroimaging studies showing that brain regions critically 
involved in mental state attribution, in particular, medial prefrontal cortex and lateral temporo-
parietal regions, continue to develop both structurally (e.g. Giedd et al., 1999; Shaw et al., 2008) 
and functionally (see Blakemore, 2008, for review) during adolescence. A priority for future work 
is to determine how this neural development contributes to a gradual, and protracted, 
improvement in the use of theory of mind for everyday action, and whether this is due to 
changes in motivation for taking account of speakers’ perspectives (e.g. as observed in 
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chimpanzees: Bräuer, Call, & Tomasello, 2007), or whether theory of mind use becomes slowly 
automatised and integrated with cognitive control systems, which may help participants resist 
interference from their own perspective (Apperly, Back, Samson, & France, 2008).  
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Table 1: Age and verbal IQ (BPVS II in children, WASI in adults) of the five groups of 
participants (all female) 
 
Groups N Age (years) Verbal IQ 
   Mean SD Range Mean SD Range 
Children I 35 8.9 0.7 7.3-9.7 117.0 9.6 98-153 
Children II 36 10.6 0.5 9.8-11.4 116.7 9.5 92-143 
Adolescent I 35 12.7 0.8 11.5-13.9 117.1 15.6 90-158 
Adolescent II 35 15.3 1.2 14.0-17.7 114.3 18.7 87-156 
Adults 36 22.8 2.3 19.1-27.5 119.5 15.1 85-138 
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Figure legends 
 
Figure 1. (a-b) Images used to explain the Director condition to the participants: subjects were 
shown an example of their view (a) and the corresponding director’s view (b) for a typical 
stimulus with four objects in occluded slots that the director cannot see (e.g. the apple). (c-d) 
Example of an Experimental (c) and a Control trial (d) in the Director condition. The participant 
hears the verbal instruction: “Move the small ball left” from the director. In the Experimental trial 
(c), if the participant ignored the director’s perspective, she would choose to move the distractor 
ball (golf ball), which is the smallest ball in the shelves but which cannot be seen by the director, 
instead of the larger ball (tennis ball) shared by both the participant’s and the instructor’s 
perspective (target). In the Control trial (d), an irrelevant object (plane) replaces the distractor 
item. 
 
Figure 2. Average percentage error (mean +SE) in Control and Experimental trials in the 
Director and No-Director conditions for each age group.  
 
Figure 3. Average response times (mean + SE) from correct trials only in Control and 
Experimental trials of the Director and No-Director conditions for each age group.  
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